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Abstract  
Human social dilemmas are often shaped by actions involving uncertain goals and returns that 
may only be achieved in the future. Climate action, voluntary vaccination and other prospective 
choices stand as paramount examples of this setting 1–4. In this context, as well as in many other 
social dilemmas, uncertainty may produce non-trivial effects 5. Whereas uncertainty about 
collective targets and their impact were shown to negatively affect group coordination and success 
6–8, no information is available about timing uncertainty, i.e. how uncertainty about when the target 
needs to be reached affects the outcome as well as the decision-making. Here we show 
experimentally — through a collective dilemma wherein groups of participants need to avoid a 
tipping point under the risk of collective loss8 — that timing uncertainty prompts not only early 
generosity9 but also polarized contributions, in which participants’ total contributions are 
distributed more unfairly than when there is no uncertainty. Analyzing participant behavior 
reveals, under uncertainty, an increase in reciprocal strategies wherein contributions are 
conditional on the previous donations of the other participants, a group analogue of the well-known 
Tit-for-Tat10,11 strategy. Although large timing uncertainty appears to reduce collective success, 
groups that successfully collect the required amount show strong reciprocal coordination. This 
conclusion is supported by a game theoretic model examining the dominance of behaviors in case 
of timing uncertainty. In general, timing uncertainty casts a shadow on the future11 that leads 
participants to respond early, encouraging reciprocal behaviors, and unequal contributions.  
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Introduction 
Public good games (PGG) provide abstractions of many real-world problems wherein personal and short-
term interests of multiple players are in conflict with societal, long-term interests 12.  Participants in such 
games can contribute voluntarily to a common good, which can, once established, be accessed without 
restrictions by all, thus even those that did not contribute. Rational selfish behavior stipulates that it is 
best to not contribute; yet such decision would be detrimental as a group is better off when all contribute. 
These games not only serve as a good model for many for social public benefits (e.g., social security, 
retirement funds), but are also recurrent in many other collective endeavors, from group hunting 13,14 to 
public health 3,15–18 and sociopolitical processes like climate change 1,6,19–22.  
 
We place our experimental within the collective risk dilemma (CRD)8, a variant of a PGG, where a 
threshold makes the outcome of the game non-linear, and the collective benefit uncertain and only 
achievable in the future23–25. This model has been adopted to address the complexity pertaining decision-
making under climate dilemmas 8,9,21,26, but its significance is general enough to be of interest to a broad 
range of Human endeavors, such as costly signaling, voting or petitioning. At the start of the game, 
participants are each given an endowment (𝐸), and they must decide whether to contribute, up to a 
predefined amount, to the common good over a fixed number of rounds. If the joint contributions of all 
the participants over those rounds are equal or above a certain threshold, then the disaster is averted, and 
they receive as a reward the remainder of the endowment (hence the dilemma). On the contrary, if the 
target is not reached, there is a probability that a disaster may occur, resulting in economical loss for all 
the participants (they lose the remainder of their endowment). This is modelled by a risk parameter and 
both experiments and theoretical analysis show that people only tend to contribute to avoid the disaster 
if they perceive the risk to be high8,20–22,26–29.  Moreover, even when the risk is high, theoretical models 
indicate that players tend to delay their contributions when the moment of disaster is known21,30.  
 
Both threshold PGG and CRD make strong assumptions about what is known in the game: Each 
participant knows from the start how much they need to acquire collectively to reach the target and how 
much time they have to achieve this. Yet in real-world scenario’s the amount as well as the timing when 
it has to be achieved may not be certain, as they are based on predictions and thus inherently suffer from 
uncertainties.  Prior work on uncertainty about what amount (threshold) should be achieved in PGG 5,31 
and CRD 6,7 has shown that  the level of cooperation, i.e. the willingness to contribute in both games, is 
negatively affected, yet no insights exist on how timing uncertainty affects the decision-making process.  
 
To answer this question, three experimental treatments are performed here. First, as a control treatment 
(NU – no uncertainty), we investigated the behavior of groups of 6 participants, wherein each can 
contribute 0, 2 or 4 EMUs (Experimental Monetary Units) at each of the 10 rounds of the experiment 
(𝑚! = 10). When the group does not reach the target contribution of 120 EMUs by the 10th round, they 
risk losing the remainder of their initial endowment (40 EMUs) with a 90% probability.  NU, thus, repeats 
the work of Milinski et al. 8, but without the climate change framing, which avoids possible cultural 
effects due to climate awareness, while enabling the generalization of our conclusions to other problems 
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captured by the CRD.  Conversely, in the second treatment (LU – low uncertainty), participants did not 
know exactly when the experiment would finish. They were told the experiment lasts on average 10 
rounds and that from round 𝑚! = 8 there was a possibility that the game ends (see Supporting 
Information (SI) for instructions): a 6 faces dice was thrown, and the game would continue if the result 
was higher than 2 (i.e., the game ends with a probability of 𝑤 = 1 [(10 −𝑚!) + 1]⁄ = 1/3	). If the 
game continues, the same process is repeated at the end of each round, until the dice result indicated the 
end of the experiment. The game can thus stop early at round 8 but also continue multiple rounds after 
round 10.  Finally, for the third treatment (HU – high uncertainty) we increased the uncertainty, i.e., the 
variance of the distribution of final rounds, by making 𝑚! = 6 (and 𝑤 = 1/5 – we throw a 10 faces dice 
in this case). Importantly, we made sure that all participants are clearly informed, in every treatment, that 
the average number of rounds is 10 (their understanding was tested before starting the experiment).  Note 
that in all three treatments, fair behavior would be to contribute in total half of one’s endowment (F=E/2), 
as it would ensure that everyone has the same, maximized gains and that the target is met.  
 
 
Figure 1. Average investment in the public account (a), average group achievement (b) and average 
number of rounds used to reach the target (c). Panel (a) shows the average investment per round and 
per group of 6 players for each treatment. For NU (black lines and triangles), the groups invested per 
round on average the minimum amount required to reach the target by the end of the game (12 EMUs 
per round). Treatments LU (red lines and stars) and HU (yellow lines and circles) assume low and high 
timing uncertainty, respectively, even though the game would on average end at 10 rounds. Our results 
suggest that the higher the uncertainty on the timing of the final round, higher the amount contributed at 
early stages of the game. As a result, when groups succeed in reaching the collective threshold, they do 
so in a smaller number of rounds (see Panel (c)). However, these early investments did not lead, on 
average, to higher collective success. Instead, in panel (b), we can see that the group achievement of HU 
is lower than NU and LU.  
 
 
Results 
a b
c
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In the absence of any timing uncertainty (NU, black lines and bars in Figure 1), the experimental results 
show that groups can reach the target amount, and that their investments per round follow closely the 
minimum required to reach the target by the end of the 10th round (Figure 1a). Figure 1b shows that more 
than 65% of the groups were successful (average group achievement, 𝜂). These groups nonetheless 
reached the targeted amount only by the last round (Figure 1c), and those that did not, were always very 
close to it, indicating a failure in the final coordination. On the contrary, whenever timing uncertainty is 
present (LU and HU), individuals tend to contribute earlier in the game, with the amount contributed per 
round increasing with the uncertainty on the game timeframe (see Figure 1a). Figure S1 in SI, provides 
similar conclusions when examining the average donations per round and per group.   
 
The motivation behind each individual’s decision to contribute early is certainly diverse. In LU, the 
investments are very close to the required donation per round for a game with only 8 rounds. Indeed, as 
shown in Figure 1c, groups that met the target in LU, did this by round 8 on average, while the fraction 
of groups that met the target did not change significantly (Figure 1b, see Methods for statistical test). 
This indicates that participants attempted to reduce the uncertainty of the game (and the risk associated) 
by investing earlier. Yet, in HU, the average investments were lower than those required to reach the 
target in 6 rounds (see Figure 1a). In this third treatment, groups only managed to reach the target on 
average by round 8 (see Figure 1c), which indicates that uncertainty affects behavior (see also Figure S2 
in SI) in a way that is subtler than simply understanding LU and HU treatments as if players would be 
playing a distinct game with less rounds. In other words, under timing uncertainty, individuals behave, 
on average, in a risk-averse fashion, reacting earlier to the collective dilemma, and finding it unlikely 
that the game would end after the average number of rounds (10, in this case).  
 
Independent of when they try to reach the target, if every participant invests half of his or her E then the 
target is reached, and they all go home with the same gains. This fair share F can be achieved by 
accumulating different combinations of 0, 2 or 4 EMUs over the different rounds.  Indeed, we observe 
in the investments per round for the NU experiment that most participants giving F do not do this by 
giving 2 in every round.  Only 15% (11 out of 72) of all participants giving F and 20% (10 out of 48) of 
the successful ones do this by always giving what could be the locally fair share.  Fairness in this game 
is thus defined at the game-level and not the round-level.     
 
Now, when considering, within each group, the cumulated investments over all rounds (C), one can 
observe that individuals react to uncertainty by either giving more or less than from F  (see Figure 2a),. 
This suggests that the presence of timing uncertainty not only leads to earlier investments, as mentioned 
earlier, but also promotes the emergence of polarized reactions and unequal contributions among 
participants, with more players’ C deviating from F than when there is no uncertainty. This observation 
is confirmed in HU (see Figure 2a), where the prevalence of unfair contributions increases further when 
compared with NU and LU. This polarized pattern may suggest a co-existence of risk-averse and risk-
seeking individuals 32,33, depending on whether individuals base their choices on a number of rounds 
below or above the average of 10 rounds. 
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The same cumulative data also reveals the shift towards early investments when considering players’ 
donations in the beginning and end of the game (see Figure 2b). Our results show how participants 
distribute their donations over time, by dividing the game into two halves (from [1,𝑚!/2] and (𝑚!/2, 𝑒𝑛𝑑], i.e., half means 5, 4 and 3 for NU, LU and HU respectively). The fraction of players whose 
C is more, equal or less than half of the fair donation, i.e., 𝐹/2, is shown for the groups that reached the 
target. In the treatments with uncertainty (LU and HU), the fraction of 𝐶 > 𝐹/2 players in the 1st half is 
significantly higher than that of the 2nd half, which means that participants invest earlier to reach the 
target. In contrast, in NU there is a slight increase in 𝐶 > 𝐹/2 during the second half of the game. This 
may be related to players trying to compensate for procrastination, resulting in higher investments at the 
end. Moreover, when comparing the donations between players that met and did not meet the target (see 
Figure S3 in SI), the difference between the fraction of players that invest 𝐶 > 𝐹/2 in the 1st half of the 
game grows with uncertainty. This highlights the importance of investing earlier and not procrastinating 
under the presence of timing uncertainty. 
 
 
Figure 2. Distribution of participant behavior and dependence on time. Fraction of players within 
successful groups that invest less, equal or more than the fair donation 𝑭 (if all participants of a group 
invest exactly 𝑭, they reach the target) (a) and how these behaviors are distributed over the first and 
second halves (1 half means 5, 4, and 3 rounds for NU, LU and HU respectively) of the game (b). Panel 
a shows that as uncertainty increases, more players invest either more or less than 𝑭, while the players 
that invest exactly 𝑭 decrease. Panel b shows how this behavior is spread across the game, by showing 
the fraction of players that invest less, equal or more than 𝑭/𝟐 in each half of the game. The plot shows 
that the investments in the first half of the game increase with uncertainty, in comparison to NU. 
 
Not only do participants tend to invest earlier in the presence of timing uncertainty, but their donations 
become dependent on what the group members did (see Figure 3), to the point that the predominant 
behavior in successful LU and HU resembles a group-level reciprocal behavior34 or Tit-for-Tat (TfT)10,35. 
Such group reciprocal behavior, or group conditional cooperation, has also been observed in linear 
public good games without a threshold36,37, and it has been identified experimentally as a beneficial 
strategy for climate action38.  
 
NU LU HU NU LU HU
a b
Total donation per 
game halfTotal donation 
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Although this behavior does not avoid free-riding (there is actually and increase as can be seen in Figure 
2a), it promotes generosity among the participants and appears necessary for a successful outcome. In 
Figure 3, we can see that there is a positive correlation between the group donations and the average 
donation of the players in LU and HU (see correlations in Table S1 in SI) for the players that met the 
target. In contrast, the players that did not meet the target do not display the same conditional behavior 
or even to the same extent, indicating that reciprocity is used here by the participants to achieve “honest” 
coordination in the presence of timing uncertainty. 
 
Figure 3. Prevalence of group reciprocity for different uncertainty levels. We show the average 
donation per player in function of the donations of the group members in the previous round (without 
the focal player). The plots are separated by treatment (columns) and by whether they met (True) or not 
(False) the target (rows). We fitted a weighted linear regression on each plot (see Methods). This analysis 
shows that there is no significant dependency on the group donations for NU, despite a slightly negative 
correlation factor for the players that reached the target, which indicates a compensatory behavior. 
However, there is a significant dependency on the group donations under uncertainty (LU and HU). 
Moreover, for LU, the groups that did not reach the target display a slight compensatory behavior, in 
contrast to the reciprocal behavior of those that did. Inside each plot, we show a subplot of the frequency 
of each action (0, 2 and 4) for the different group donations. These plots depict clearly how, for LU and 
HU, the frequency of action 4 increases with the group donation on the previous round, while action 0 
increases when the previous donations were low. In comparison, action 2 is predominant when there is 
no uncertainty or when groups did not achieve the goal (LU-HU). 
 
The non-trivial dynamics and behavioral ecology of switching from compensating to reciprocal behavior 
may be explained by a game theoretical model, that describes the behavioral dynamics through an 
evolutionary process (see Methods for a full description). Given the strategy profiles identified in Figure 
3, human subjects mostly adhere to either unconditional investments or conditional strategies based on 
the level of investments in the previous round. For simplicity, we define here three unconditional 
heuristics or strategies, i.e. always-2 (gives 2 in every round), always-4 (invest gives 4 in each round), 
always-0 (invest nothing throughout the game), and the two conditional ones, i.e.  compensator (will 
invest 4 when the group members did not invest) and reciprocal (will invest 4 as long as the group 
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members invest). All strategies will stop contributing once the collective target is achieved. We consider 
a population of individuals who may adopt one of these five strategies and revise their choices based on 
the relative success of each strategy 39 (see Methods for details). More advanced strategies could be 
considered, yet even with this baseline model, our experimental observations can be explained. Indeed, 
the model confirms that, under uncertainty, the reciprocal strategy prevails among those strategies that 
contribute to the collective good (see Figure 4a), while capturing also that the group achievement does 
not change significantly with uncertainty. Moreover, the model indicates that the always-2 strategy is 
only stable when there is no timing uncertainty (see Figure S6 in SI). The presence of this type of 
uncertainty induces the population into cyclic dynamics, where the dominance of direct reciprocity 
increases with uncertainty. The model is also able to capture the inequality in contributions and the 
increase in polarization observed in the experiments (see Figure 4b). 
 
Figure 4. Emergence of reciprocal strategy and polarization in a stochastic evolutionary model. 
Panel (a) shows how that group achievement does not vary significantly with timing uncertainty (left y 
axis), while the predominance of the reciprocal strategy over the strategies that contribute to reach the 
target increases (right y axis and boxes with slashes). Panel (b) shows that the polarization increases 
when there is timing uncertainty. These results reproduce the trend observed in the experimental data. 
(𝒁 = 𝟓𝟎,𝑵 = 𝟔, 𝒓 = 𝟎. 𝟗, 𝑬 = 𝟒𝟎, 𝝉 = 𝟏𝟐𝟎, 𝜷 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟑, see Methods for a detailed explanation of the 
parameters). 
 
Discussion 
Despite the simplicity of our experimental setup and associated theoretical model, the trends identified 
may hold potential lessons for dealing with uncertainty in local and global governance. Our results show 
that contrary to the outcome for other types of uncertainty, timing uncertainty promotes early investments 
by the participants. Moreover, timing uncertainty appears to increase polarized reactions among the 
participants, suggesting a co-existence of risk-prone and risk-averse preferences, while diminishing the 
a
b
Group 
achievement
Proportion 
of reciprocals
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number of players contributing a fair share and increasing those that give less or more. Interestingly, our 
result relates nicely with recent findings in the context of behavioral dynamics in urban settings. It has 
been shown that uncertainty associated with big cities intensified both risk-seeking and risk-taking 
reactions, while the predictability of small villages encouraged more homogeneous and intermediate 
choices40. Such heterogeneity highlights the intricacy of the study of the emergence of polarized 
preferences beyond contagious processes41, with potential implications in various socio-political and 
ecological contexts. 
 
At the same time, conditional behaviors emerge in the presence of timing uncertainty, and groups that 
were able to coordinate through reciprocal behavior were more successful than those that simply played 
a fixed strategy or compensated for those giving not enough. This heavily contrasts with the predominant 
behavior when the length of the game is certain, in which most players unconditionally opt for a fair 
share F. Our results suggest that, when the future is uncertain and stakeholders are aware of it, they tend 
to respond early, encouraging others to reach the target together. This effect may be potentially 
maximized when combined with communication, institutions or costly commitments 20,42–45.  
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Methods 
 
Experiments. The results of our experiment were obtained by testing 246 participants (41% females) 
that were divided into 41 groups of six subjects each in a computerized experiment (using the software 
available at https://github.com/Socrats/beelbe). Ethical approval was obtained from the Ethical 
Commission for Human Sciences at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel to perform this experiment. Most of 
the participants were bachelor/master students of either the Université Libre de Bruxelles or the Vrije 
Universiteit Brussel. The average age of participants was 24 (with a standard deviation of ~4 years). 
During each session of the experiments, participants were assigned randomly into groups and were not 
allowed to communicate (physical barriers were set up between them). Participants never knew who the 
other members of their group were.  
In the control treatment (NU), 12 groups played the collective-risk dilemma (see main text) defined as 
in8 with the difference that the game was not framed as a climate change scenario, which makes the 
results more general to other scenarios of collective-risk where there is an uncertain deadline. Indeed, 
this type of N-person dilemma, combining non-linear and uncertain returns which are only reached in 
the future, are recurrent in many human collective endeavors, from public health measures to group 
hunting. In the treatment with low uncertainty (LU) and high uncertainty (HU), another 14 and 15 groups, 
respectively, played the variant of the game in which the final round was decided by a random process. 
After a minimum number of rounds (8 rounds in LU, and 6 in HU), the probability of the game ending 
after each round was 𝑤=1/3 and 𝑤=1/5 in LU and HU, respectively. To implement this uncertainty in 
LU (HU) a 6 (10) faces dice was thrown at the end of round 8 (6), and the game would continue if the 
result was higher than 2, thus generating the probability for ending the game in LU  (HU). 
 
Identifying polarization of donations. We divided the participants on our experiment based on their 
total donations throughout the game and their relationship to what we call fair donation 𝐹. This value 
corresponds to the minimum donation required for a group to be successful, if all participants invest the 
same, i.e., if all participants invest exactly 𝐹 the group will be successful. This value corresponds to half 
of the endowment (𝐹 = 𝐸/2). Therefore, we quantify the fraction of participants that contribute, in total, 
less (𝐶 < 𝐹), equal (𝐶 = 𝐹) or more (𝐶 > 𝐹) than 𝐹. In Figure 2, we show that the fraction of participants 
that invest 𝐶 < 𝐹 and 𝐶 > 𝐹 grows with timing uncertainty, while fair players (𝐶 = 𝐹) diminish. We 
associate this divergence of donations to an increase of polarized reactions. 
 
Identifying conditional behavior. Conditional behaviors were assessed through the analysis of the 
average donation of each player as a function of the donations of the other group members in the previous 
round (see Figure 3). For this reason, the plot starts with the data after the first round. Also, we only take 
into account the data of the experiment before the target is reached, i.e., when the public account contains 
less than 120 EMUs. We adopt a weighted linear regression so that samples with smaller errors were 
more important than those with large ones. The weight of a point 𝑖 is calculated as 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡" = 𝜎#̅%&, 
where the errors 𝜎#̅ were computed as : 
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𝜎#̅ = S ∞, |𝑥| = 1W𝜎'()"*+,|𝑥| 	 , |𝑥| > 1 
Here 𝜎'()"*+, = 4, representing the range of the values an action can take, and |𝑥| indicates the number 
of samples used to calculate the average of the samples vector 𝑥. This way, points calculated from only 
1 sample, almost do not count for the regression.   
 
Statistics. In Figure 1a the averages and error bars (95% confidence interval) are computed across groups 
(n=12 for NU, n=14 for LU and n=15 for HU). For LU and HU, after the minimum number of rounds, 𝑚!, n decreases, since some of the groups finished the game. For LU, 𝑛 = 9 for round 9, 𝑛 = 6 for round 
10, 𝑛 = 4 for round 11, 𝑛 = 2 until round 17. For HU, 𝑛 = 12 for round 7, 𝑛 = 7 for round 8, 𝑛 = 4 for 
round 9, 𝑛 = 2 until round 13, and 𝑛 = 1 until round 19. In Figure 1b each box plot display the proportion 
of groups that were successful for each of the treatments. 8 out of 12 groups were successful in NU, 9 
out of 14 for LU and 7 out of 15 for HU. We performed a Chi-square test of independence (𝑃 =0.49952, 𝑛 = 41, 𝑑𝑓 = 2, χ- = 1.38) that issues that the differences between the group achievements 
among the treatments are not significant. The error bars in Figure 1c represent the 95% confidence 
interval. This figure shows the average round in which successful groups reached the target (n=8 for NU, 
n=9 for LU and n=7 for HU). In Figure 2 we calculate the fraction of successful players for each treatment 
that assume one of 3 contribution behaviors. The total number of players in each of the fractions (𝐶 < 𝐹, 𝐶 = 𝐹, 𝐶 > 𝐹) is (9, 21, 18) for NU, (13, 17, 24) for LU and (13, 8, 21) for HU. The error bars in Figure 
3 were calculated as described in the “identifying conditional behavior” section (see SI for detail on the 
number of samples for the correlation analysis).  
 
Game theoretical model. As an alternative to considering fully-rational agents, we  describe the 
behavioral dynamics through an evolutionary process46, in which individuals tend to copy those 
appearing to be more successful. We consider a finite population of Z individuals, who interact in groups 
of size N, in which they engage in the collective-risk dilemma with multiple rounds. Each individual can 
adopt one of the ns=5 strategies that mimic the behaviors observed on the experimental data: always-2, 
always-4, always-0, compensator, and reciprocal. The first three strategies are unconditional, i.e., they 
will always invest the same, independently of the behavior of the other group members. Differently, 
compensator and reciprocal are conditional strategies that adapt their behavior to the rest of the group 
according to a threshold of total investments per round. We consider this threshold to be 10, which is 
exactly half of the maximum investment per round, without the focal player. In this manner,  
compensators always start investing 2, and, afterwards, invest 0 as long as the sum of contributions of 
the rest of group members in the previous round is below 10 units; otherwise they will invest 4 EMUs. 
The behavior of reciprocal is the exact opposite of compensators: They start by investing 2 EMUs and 
afterwards they invest 4 EMUs as long the sum of contributions of the other members of the group in the 
previous rounds is above or equal to 10 units; otherwise they invest 0. We do not assume any population 
structure, such that individuals are equally likely to interact with each other (the so-called well-mixed 
assumption). The success (or fitness) of an individual can be computed as the average payoff obtained 
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from playing in multiple groups randomly sampled from the population. As a result, all individuals 
adopting one of the ns=5 strategies can be seen as equivalent, on average.  
To study the behavioral resulting from this set of strategies, we adopt a stochastic birth-death process 
combined with the pairwise comparison rule39 to describe the social learning dynamics of each of the 
strategies in a finite population. At each time-step, a randomly chosen individual 𝐴 has the opportunity 
to revise their strategy by imitating (or not) the strategy of a randomly selected member of the population 
B. The imitation will occur with a probability which increases with the fitness difference between 𝐴 and 𝐵. Here we adopt the Fermi function 𝑝 ≡ b1 + 𝑒.(0!%0")c%&, where 𝛽 controls the intensity of selection 
(we use 𝛽 = 0.003), and fA (fB) is the average fitness of 𝐴 (𝐵). In addition, we consider that, with a 
mutation probability 𝜇, individuals adopt a randomly chosen strategy, freely exploring the strategy space. 
Overall this adaptive process defines a large-scale Markov process, whose complete characterization 
becomes unfeasible as one increases the population size and number of strategies47. However, this 
analysis of this stochastic dynamics is largely simplified in the limit of rare mutations. In this case, we 
are able to compute analytically the relative prevalence of each of the different strategies. Moreover, as 
shown in the Supporting Information by means of large-scale computer simulations, this analytical 
approximation turns out to be valid for much wider interval of mutation regimes. In this limit, when a 
new strategy appears through mutation, one of two outcomes occurs long before the occurrence of a new 
mutation: either the population faces the fixation of newly introduced strategy, or the mutant strategy is 
wiped out from the population. Hence, there will be a maximum of two strategies present simultaneously 
in the population48,49. This allows one to describe the behavioral dynamics in terms of a reduced Markov 
Chain of size 𝑛, = 5, whose transitions are defined by the fixation probabilities 𝜌"2 	of a single mutant 
with strategy 𝑗 in a population of individuals adopting another strategy 𝑖. This probability is given by 𝜌"2 = h1 + ∑ ∏ 3#(4)3$(4)546&7%&56& k%&39,50,51, where 𝑇%(𝑘) (𝑇8(𝑘)) is the probability to decrease (increase) the 
number of individuals with the mutant strategy: 𝑇±(𝑘) = 4: :%4: n1 + 𝑒∓.<0%%0&=o%&. In the limit of neutral 
selection (𝛽 = 0), the fixation probabilities become independent of the fitness values and equal to 1/Z, 
offering a convenient reference scenario (see below). Since we will have at most two different strategies 
in the population, we can calculate the fitness 𝑓' of a strategy 𝑎, in a finite population of size 𝑍 and 𝑘 
individuals of strategy 𝑎 and 𝑍 − 𝑘 of strategy 𝑏, as 𝑓' = s:%&7%&t%& ∑ h4%&2 k h :%47%2%&kΠ'>(𝑘 + 1)7%&46!  27, 
where s:%&7%&t%&∑ h4%&2 k h :%47%2%&k7%&46!  represents a hypergeometric sampling (sampling without 
replacement) of the population and Π'>(𝑘 + 1) is the payoff of strategy 𝑎 when facing strategy 𝑏, while 
the group is composed of 𝑘 + 1 individuals with strategy 𝑎. We numerically estimate pairwise payoffs Π"2 between every strategy pair 𝑖 and 𝑗, for each possible composition of a group of 𝑁 participants with 𝑘 members of using strategy 𝑖 and 𝑁 − 𝑘 using strategy 𝑗. This is achieved by averaging over 103 games 
for each composition of the group and treatments (NU, LU and HU, using the same parameters adopted 
in the lab experiments).  
Equipped with these tools, one can now compute the prevalence of each strategy through the stationary 
distribution pw of the ns-states Markov chain. The stationary distribution characterizes the average time 
the population spends in each monomorphic state w. This can be computed analytically as the normalized 
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eigenvector associated with the eigenvalue 1 of the transposed of the transition matrix M of the Markov 
Chain48,49,51 with all fixation probabilities 𝜌"2. To compute the expected group achievement (𝜂) shown in 
Figure 4a, we weight the probability of success of each of the monomorphic states (populations with 
only one of the 5 strategies) by their predominance (given by the stationary distribution), i.e., 𝜂 =∑ 𝑝?𝐻?? , where 𝑝 is a row vector containing the stationary distribution, and Η is a column vector 
containing the probability of success of each monomorphic state. In our case, the probability of success 
is always 1 for populations of always-2, reciprocal and always-4 players, while it is 0 for always-0. 
Compensators are only successful if the game lasts more than 10 rounds, therefore their probability of 
success is (1 − 𝑤)&!%5', since the random process that decides the final round under timing uncertainty 
follows a geometric distribution. The calculation of the fraction of players that contribute less, equal or 
more than 𝐹, used in Figure 4b, is done in a similar fashion. In this case, we need to calculate the 
probability that a population consisting of each of the monomorphic states will contribute 𝐶 < 𝐹, 𝐶 =𝐹, 𝐶 > 𝐹. Since we can calculate the contributions of the players depending on the number of rounds of 
the game, the computation of these probabilities is straightforward. The always-2 players will always 
invest 𝐹, always-4 and reciprocal will contribute 𝐶 > 𝐹, and always-0 𝐶 < 𝐹. Once more, compensators 
will only contribute 𝐶 > 𝐹 if the number of rounds is bigger than 10, otherwise they contribute 𝐶 < 𝐹. 
We then multiply these probabilities by the stationary distribution to obtain the fraction of players that 
assume each of the previous behaviors. In Figure 4 all other parameters controlling the environment are 
set to be the same as in our lab experiments: the risk 𝑟 = 0.9, the initial endowment 𝐸 = 40 and the 
target is 𝜏 = 120. To obtain further intuition behind the emergence of cooperation, group achievement 
and strategies in each treatment, we also analyze the typical flow of probability between the different 
monomorphic states in the presence and absence of uncertainty (see invasion diagrams in Figure S6). 
Arrows represent transitions favored by natural selection, i.e., those whose fixation probability exceeds 
1/Z (associated with the fixation probability of a mutant under neutral evolution). A strategy for which 
no mutant adopting any other strategy has a selective advantage is said to be an evolutionary robust 
strategy (ERS)52, a convenient measure of strategic stability in this context. As shown in Figure S6, 
timing uncertainty changes the set of evolutionary robust strategies, benefiting the flow of probabilities 
towards the adoption of reciprocal strategies. 
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Timing uncertainty in collective risk dilemmas encourages group 
reciprocation and polarization  
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C. Santos, and Tom Lenaerts 
 
Nomenclature 
For the remainder of this document we will refer to each one of the 3 treatments analyzed in 
this manuscript in the following way: 
• Treatment 1: no uncertainty treatment – NU 
• Treatment 2: low uncertainty treatment – LU 
• Treatment 3: high uncertainty treatment - HU 
Extended Methods 
Experimental procedure 
During each session of the experiment, all participants were required to read the instructions 
on the screen of their assigned computer before the start. The same instructions were provided 
on a printed copy that they could consult throughout the experiment. After reading, all 
participants went through a test with the goal to check their understanding. In case of 
problems the coordinators discussed with them their errors ensuring that everything was clear.   
Throughout the experiment each participant observed on his or her screen the amount left in 
his or her private account and the actions of each of the group members in the previous 
round. They are thus able to keep track of the behavior of their group mates, but do not know 
their identity. They could not observe the current state of the public account, yet, they were 
encouraged to keep track of it by asking them how much they believe is in the account at each 
round. After the final round (in the treatment with uncertainty they could observe the result of 
the random value produced by the dice that defined the end of the game), the participants 
could see on the screen how much was invested in the public account in total and how much 
was left in their private account, as well as the conversion to euros. In the case this value was 
below the target, a message would show the result of the dice that decided whether they 
would lose or not the remaining endowment. Finally, before the participants were allowed to 
leave the laboratory, they were requested to complete a small survey about their experience 
during the experiment. 
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Our experiment models the effect of timing uncertainty on the collective-risk dilemma. 
Therefore, there is a stochastic component that we must explain to participants carefully. In 
order to do this, we used the known example of a virtual dice. For instance, to explain that 
there is a probability of 1/3 that the game would finish after round 8 in the low uncertainty 
(LU) treatment, we explain that the computer will “throw a virtual dice of 6 faces, and if the 
result is either 1 or 2, then the game will end”. We also tell participants that, on average, the 
game takes 10 rounds, to give them an intuition about the distribution of this stochastic 
process. The details of the instructions for all three treatments can be found in the following 
sections. 
Instructions for the control treatment (no uncertainty – NU) 
Each participant had access to the following instructions, both in digital and paper format: 
 
Instructions to the experiment 
Welcome to this experiment where you can earn money! 
 
You are about to participate in an experiment on iterative decision-making, conducted by 
researchers from the Vrije Universiteit Brussel and the Université Libre de Bruxelles. In this 
experiment, you will earn some money, and the amount will be determined by your choices 
and the choices of the other participants. 
 
Your privacy is guaranteed: The other participants will not know who you are during the 
experiment and the results of the experiment are stored in an anonymous manner. 
 
It is very important that you remain silent during the whole experiment, and that you never 
communicate with other participants, neither verbally, nor in any other way. When in doubt 
or when you have a question, please just raise your hand and an experimenter will approach 
you. If you do not remain silent, or if you behave in any way that could potentially disturb the 
experiment, you will be asked to leave the laboratory, and you will not be paid. 
 
All your earnings during the experiment will be expressed in Experimental Monetary Units 
(EMUs), which will be transformed into Euros with a change rate of 0.75 Euro to 1 EMU. At 
the end of the experiment, a show up fee of 2.5 euros will be added to your earnings. 
 
You will be paid privately by bank transfer to your account within a week after the 
experiment. At the end of the experiment you will be requested to provide your IBAN 
number and BIC code to make the transfer. 
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Before starting, you will be randomly assigned into a group. You will never know the identity 
of the other participants of the group. However, the experiment takes 10 rounds and you will 
be able to observe the actions of the previous round of every member of your group, starting 
from round 2. 
 
Login to the experiment 
 
Before the experiment can start, please, enter the user login and password you have been 
given into the login page displayed in the browser of the computer assigned to you.  
 
Once you have logged in, you will be able to see on your screen the same instructions that are 
written on this paper. 
 
Wait for the instructor’s signal before you proceed. 
 
General Information 
 
At the beginning of the experiment you will be randomly assigned to a group, which will 
include 5 other randomly selected participants.  
 
During the whole experiment, you will interact only with those 5 other group members.  
 
At the beginning of the experiment you and each other group member will receive a personal 
endowment of 40 EMUs. 
 
The whole experiment consists of 10 rounds of the following game. 
 
In each round of the game, you have to decide whether to add 0, 2 or 4 EMUs in a public 
account. 
 
If the public account contains at least 120 EMUs after the 10th round, each member of your 
group will keep their savings, i.e. the EMUs of your endowment that were not put in the 
public account. 
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However, if this minimum is not reached, the computer will “throw a virtual dice” and each 
group member will lose his or her remaining EMUs with a 90% chance (9 times out of 
10). 
 
Thus, with a 10% chance (1 out of 10) you will keep the remaining EMUs in your private 
account. 
 
Course of Action 
 
Every round has the same structure and consists of the following steps: 
 
Step 1:   Choice of how much to contribute (0,2 or 4). 
Step 2:   Make a prediction about the amount in the public account. 
 
When the experiment reaches its final round, you will move to the final 3rd step: 
 
Step 3:   Check if the threshold of the public account has been achieved and 
calculation of final payoffs 
 
Step 1: The contribution choice 
In the Step 1, every member will be asked “How many EMUs do you want to contribute to 
the public account”. Three buttons are provided: 0, 2 and 4 EMUs. You can select the 
amount by clicking the button, as is shown in the figure below: 
 
Image 1: View of Step 1. 
 
On the right side of the screen you can see the time you have left to make your decision and 
the amount of EMUs in your “Personal Account”. You must make your decision within 
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the time displayed on the screen. The “Time left” square will start blinking when you are 
getting out of time. Nothing happens when the time runs out, yet if you take too long to make 
a decision the experiment will take too long. Please respond as quickly as possible.  
 
The table “Donations of the previous round” shows the values donated by all the members of 
your group in the previous round. In the first column, you see your own donation from the 
previous round. In the other columns, you see the decisions of the other users. The choice of 
each group member will always be shown in the same column.  This information about the 
previous donations is only available after the first round. 
 
Step 2: Predict the content of the public account 
After step 1, you will go to a next screen. On this screen, you are asked the following 
question: “Please, estimate the current total content of the public account”. You should 
enter an estimation of how many EMUs you think the public account contains in total after 
all members (including you) have made their donations in the current round.  
 
This is an example of what you will see in this step: 
 
Image 2: View of Step 2. 
 
Step 3: Last round and calculation of final payoffs 
After the last round, you will jump to a final screen.  
 
If the accumulated contributions to the account are equal or higher than 120 EMUs, then you 
will be informed that you can keep the amount of the endowment that you did not put in the 
public account.  
 
For example, if you put in total 20 EMUs of your endowment (40 EMUs) in the public 
account during the experiment, you will gain the remaining 20 EMUs (i.e. 40 - 20).  This 
amount is converted into Euro’s. 
 
The screen will show the following text: “CONGRATULATIONS! Your group collected XXX 
EMUs, which is greater or equal to 120 EMUs. So you may keep the amount remaining in 
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your private account. Please fill in the amount in Euro’s you see on this screen on the 
payment document you received before clicking the continue button. This amount consists of 
both your private winnings and the show-up fee.” 
 
However, if the minimum of 120 EMUs is not reached, the computer will “throw a virtual 
dice” and all group members will lose all their remaining EMUs with a 90% chance. 
There are thus two possible outcomes: 
 
On one hand, with a chance of 9 out of 10, the screen will show: “Your group collected 
XXX EMUs, which is lower than 120 EMUs. The server has generated a random number 
between 1 and 100.  The resulting value is YYY, which is smaller than 91. This means that you 
all lose the remaining endowment in your private accounts. Please fill in the amount in 
Euro’s you see on this screen on the payment document you received before clicking the 
continue button. This amount is the show-up fee.”  
 
On the other hand, with a chance of 1 out of 10, the screen will show: “Your group 
collected XXX EMUs, which is lower than 120 EMUs. The server has generated a random 
number between 1 and 100.  The resulting value is YYY, which is bigger than 90. This means 
that you all win the remaining endowment in your private accounts. Please fill in the amount 
in Euro’s you see on this screen on the payment document you received before clicking the 
continue button. This amount consists of both your private winnings and the show-up fee.”  
 
End of experiment questionnaire 
At the end of the experiment you will be directed to a form containing a short questionnaire. 
Please answer to all the questions honestly, the information you add here is an important part 
of this experiment. Any information that you may include in this form will remain completely 
anonymous and cannot be linked to you in any way. Once you have finished filling in the 
questionnaire, please, click the button submit. 
 
At the end of the experiment, you will be called by one of the organisers to make the 
payment official. Please stay seated and do not talk until you are called and have left the 
room. 
 
Please note: 
Communication is not allowed during the whole experiment. If you have a question, please 
raise your hand.  
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All decisions are made anonymously, i.e. no other participant learns the identity of the other 
decision makers.  
 
The payment is also anonymous,  no participant learns from us about the amount that another 
participant received in the experiment. 
Instructions for the low uncertainty treatment (LU) 
The instructions of the treatment with low timing uncertainty differ slightly from that of the 
previous treatment. Below we describe only the sections that change with respect to the 
control treatment (NU).  
 
Instructions to the experiment 
 
Before starting, you will be randomly assigned into a group. You will never know the identity 
of the other participants of the group. However, the experiment takes at least 8 rounds and 
you will be able to observe the actions of the previous round of every member of your group, 
starting from round 2. 
 
General Information 
 
The whole experiment consists of minimum 8 and on average 10 rounds, but it could be 
more than that. 
 
The probability that the next round will happen after round 8 is 2/3. This means that at the 
end of each round, starting from round 8, a “virtual fair dice” with 6 faces, will be thrown. If 
the result is “1” or “2”, the game will end. Otherwise, when the result is “3”, “4”, “5” or “6”, 
the game will continue to the next round, in which the process is repeated. 
 
If the public account contains at least 120 EMUs after the final round, each member of your 
group will keep their savings, i.e. the EMUs of your endowment that were not put in the 
public account. 
 
Course of Action 
 
Every round has the same structure and consists of the following steps: 
 
Step 1:  Choice of how much to contribute (0,2 or 4). 
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Step 2:  Make a prediction about the amount in the public account. 
 
The end of the experiment is decided by a random process. Starting from round 8 the game 
will go through a 3rd step: 
 
Step 3:  Check if the experiment should end by throwing a “virtual fair dice”. 
 
When the experiment reaches its final round, you will move to the final 4th step: 
 
Step 4:  Check if the threshold of the public account has been achieved and 
calculation of final payoffs 
 
Step 3: Check if the game should end 
The probability that the next round will happen after round 8 is 2/3. This means that at the 
end of each round, starting from round 8, a “virtual fair dice” with 6 faces, will be thrown. If 
the result is “1” or “2”, the game will end. Otherwise, when the result is “3”, “4”, “5” or “6”, 
the game, will continue to the next round, in which the process is repeated. This means that 
the experiment will have a minimum of 8 rounds. 
 
There is a “virtual fair dice” for each group. Thus, the experiment can have different rounds, 
depending on which group you are in. 
 
You will be able to see on the screen the following text if the game continues: “The result of 
the dice was X, which is different from “1” or “2”. Therefore, the experiment will continue 
to the next round. Please, click now on the button Ok.” 
 
However, if the result of the dice is “1” or “2”, the screen will show the following text: “The 
result of the dice was X. Therefore, the experiment will end. Please, click now on the button 
Ok.”  
 
Instructions the high uncertainty treatment (HU)	
The instructions for the treatment with high timing uncertainty differ from treatment 2 (low 
timing uncertainty) only in that the minimum number of rounds is 6 and the probability that 
the game ends afterwards is 1/5 (or 2/10). However, the average number of rounds remains 
10. Below we describe only the sections that differ from the LU treatment: 
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General Information 
 
The whole experiment consists of minimum 6 and on average 10 rounds, but it could be 
more than that. 
 
The probability that the next round will happen after round 6 is 8/10. This means that at the 
end of each round, starting from round 6, a “virtual fair dice” with 10 faces, will be thrown. If 
the result is “1” or “2”, the game will end. Otherwise, when the result is “3”, “4”, “5”, “6”, 
“7”, “8”, “9”  or “10”, the game will continue to the next round, in which the process is 
repeated. 
 
Step 3: Check if the game should end 
The probability that the next round will happen after round 6 is 8/10. This means that at the 
end of each round, starting from round 6, a “virtual fair dice” with 10 faces, will be thrown. 
If the result is “1” or “2”, the game will end. Otherwise, when the result is “3”, “4”, “5”, “6”, 
“7”, “8”, “9”  or “10”, the game will continue to the next round, in which the process is 
repeated. This means that the experiment will have a minimum of 6 rounds. 
Testing participant’s understanding 
After reading the instruction, participants are requested to complete a short questionnaire that 
tests their understanding. Participants are not allowed to start the experiment until they 
answer to all questions correctly. 
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Supplementary experimental results 
In Figure 1 of the main text we display the averaged cumulative contributions per group for 
each of the 3 treatments of our experiment. In Figure S1 we present the average contributions 
per round. Here we observe that, for the successful groups (met target = True), the 
investments in the treatments with uncertainty were always higher than in the control 
treatment (NU) before the minimum number of rounds. The figure also shows that for NU, 
the difference between successful groups and non-successful ones is mostly related to the 
contributions in the last two rounds. While the successful groups increase their contributions 
slightly by the end (compensate for other participants), the non-successful groups lower them. 
This highlights the importance of coordination when the time is certain. For the treatments 
with timing uncertainty this effect disappears, and successful groups contribute more and 
earlier.  
 
To reveal the differences between the treatments, we used a t-SNE 2D visualization (Figure 
S2) of the multidimensional vector that represents each participant (which is represented by a 
tuple of the actions she took at each round and the total donations of their group mates in the 
previous round). This representation is able to cluster (with some noise) the participants of 
each treatment, which allows us to confirm visually that there are differences between them. 
Each color in the figure represents one treatment and the colors are the same as those in 
Figure 1 of the main manuscript (NU black, LU red, HU yellow). 
 
In Figure S3 we show a comparison between the participants behaviors in the first and second 
parts of the game for the participants that met the target (this corresponds to Figure 2 of the 
main manuscript) and those that didn’t. We can observe an increasing difference between the 
generous players (those that invest C > F/2) in the first half of the game as timing uncertainty 
grows. This highlights the importance of early investments to nudge participants into 
cooperation when there is a shadow on the future. 
 
Figure S4 shows the frequency of each of the 3 possible actions, depending on the group 
investments (without the focal player) in the previous round. This figure combines the 
participants from  both the successful (met the target) and unsuccessful sessions. While in the 
treatment without timing uncertainty, action 2 is predominant, in the treatment with 
uncertainty, we observe and increase of the extreme actions (0 and 4). Moreover, action 4 
occurs with higher frequency when the previous donations of the other members of the group 
were higher than 10, and action 0 when they were lower. 
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We have also extended our analysis of the conditional behavior to study how it depends on 
time (first half and second half of the game) and on the previous action of the focal player. 
Yet, these results must be analyzed with care, since the amount of data used to calculate each 
point, becomes smaller with each new feature taken into account (which is reflected in the 
error bars of the figures). Figure S5 indicates that there are differences in conditional behavior 
depending on the half of the game. This is expected, since Figure 2 of the main text already 
shows that in the treatments with timing uncertainty, the investments are higher in the first 
half. 
 
Error! Reference source not found. shows the correlation results and the associated p-
values for the results presented in Figure 3 of the main text. The correlations for the treatment 
without uncertainty are negative, which indicates a compensatory behavior. For the 
treatments with uncertainty, however, these correlations are positive, indicating a reciprocal 
or Tit-for-Tat behavior. Nevertheless, only the correlations for the successful players of LU 
and HU are statistically significant (P < 0.001). 
Dependency analysis 
The results in Table S2-S4 are all obtained using an ordered logistic regression or cumulative 
link model1, implemented in the polr function implemented in the MASS package in R. We 
estimate the probability of taking an action (0, 2 and 4) depending on a series of features. This 
allows us to study how the actions of the participants on the experiment depend on these 
features. We used this analysis to select the most relevant features for the behavioral 
representation of a participant, which was  then used to produce the results of Figure 2 and 3 
of the main manuscript. The polr function differs from a multimodal regression in that it 
performs a ordered logistic regression, i.e., it takes into account the order of the labels. This is 
important in our case, since the donations 0, 2 or 4 are ordered. 
 
The features included in the regression are:  
• public_account: The public account of the game, i.e., the cumulative sum of 
investments of all participants 
• private_account: The private account of the participant, i.e. the remaining endowment 
at a given round. 
• round_donations_others: The donations of the members of the group in the previous 
round, without the focal player. 
• actions_prev: The action of the focal player in the previous round. 
• GameHalf2ndHalf: The half of the game in which the action takes place (1st half, 2nd 
half). 
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• rnd: A random binary number (0 or 1). This is used to check that the regression is 
producing correct results. The actions of the players should not depend on a random 
variable. 
• public_account:GameHalf2ndHalf: Interaction term between the public account and 
the game half. Represents the degree to which there is an interaction between these 
two variables.  
• actions_prev:GameHalf2ndHalf: Interaction term between the previous action of the 
player and the game half. 
• private_account:GameHalf2ndHalf: Interaction term between the private account and 
the game half. 
 
 
 
Figure S1. Average joint contribution per round and per group. The plots are 
separated by whether the group reached or not the target collective investments. The 
dashed lines show the fair sum of contributions per round if the game had 10 rounds 
for each of the treatments (black – NU, red – LU, yellow – HU). We only show the 
contributions before the target is reached.  
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Figure S2. T-SNE representation of participants’ behaviors. The t-SNE plot shows a 
2-dimensional representation of the behavior of each player based on decisions taken 
by the individuals and their group mates: Similar behaviors are positioned in nearby 
points and dissimilar ones are characterized by distant points. We can observe that the 
data points of each treatment form clusters, which suggests that the behavior of 
participants is different in each treatment (the axis dimensions represent the 2D 
projection of the features used in the t-SNE embedding). 
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Figure S3. Distribution of players according to their investments. The plots are 
separated by whether the groups reached (successful) or not (non-successful) the 
target. The plots show the fraction of players that invested more, equal or less than 𝑭/𝟐, i.e., half of the fair donation, in the first and second half of the game. If every 
player invested in total 𝑭. during the game, the group would reach the target with 
exactly 120 EMUs. For T2 and T3 we consider half of the game to be 𝒎𝟎/𝟐. We can 
observe that the number of participants that invest more than 𝑭/𝟐 in the first half of 
the game (non-procrastinators), increase considerably in the treatments with 
uncertainty. It is also noticeable that the difference in the fraction of non-
procrastinators between the groups that met and did not meet the target, increases 
with uncertainty. 
 
 
Figure S4. Conditional behavior per treatment. Distribution of actions in function of 
the donations of the group members (without the focal player) in the previous round. 
In NU (on the left) players display an almost uniform behavior over the set of 
donations of their group members in the previous round (2 is the predominant action), 
NU LU HU NU LU HU
Successful groups Non-successful groups
C<F/2
C=F/2
C>F/2
0.042
0.189
0.208
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with an increase of action 4 when the group members donated a total of 4, related to 
the players trying to compensate for their teammates on the last rounds. In contrast, in 
the treatments with timing uncertainty (center and right) players are more likely to 
donate 4 when their group members donated over 10 EMUs in the previous round and 
increase their 0 donations when the group members do the same, which corresponds 
to a Tit-for-Tat behavior. 
 
 
Figure S5. Analysis of conditional behavior separated by half of the game. 
Correlation between behavior of others and the behavior of a focal player separated 
both by treatment and by the first 5 rounds and the rest of the game. 
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treatment target correlation p-value Number of 
observations 
NU  
(No uncertainty) 
FALSE -0.117 0.086 216 
TRUE -0.076 0.114 432 
LU 
(Low uncertainty) 
FALSE 0.019 0.775 228 
TRUE 0.279 < 0.001 408 
HU 
(High uncertainty) 
FALSE 0.092 0.114 300 
TRUE 0.268 < 0.001 282 
Table S1. Correlation between behavior of others and the behavior of a focal player. 
This table shows the Pearson correlation coefficients and the associated p-value 
between the sum of donations of the other members of a group in a previous round 
and the action of the focal player on the current round. These results are associated 
with Figure 3 of the main text. The correlation is positive (P < 0.001) for the 
successful players (target = TRUE) on LU and HU, while the ones that failed to reach 
the target have a correlation close to 0. The players in NU have a small negative 
correlation that indicates the presence of compensating behaviors. 
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No uncertainty treatment (NU): 
Coefficients Value Std. Error t value p value 
public_account -0.0370 0.0181 -2.0436 0.0410 
private_account -0.2503 0.0969 -2.5822 0.0098 
round_donations_others 0.0656 0.0650 1.0091 0.3129 
actions_prev 0.3860 0.1749 2.2076 0.0273 
GameHalf2ndHalf -13.4311 4.2979 -3.1251 0.0018 
rnd 0.0510 0.1660 0.3074 0.7585 
public_account:GameHalf2ndHalf 0.0583 0.0204 2.8645 0.0042 
round_donations_others:GameHalf2ndHalf -0.2008 0.0765 -2.6266 0.0086 
actions_prev:GameHalf2ndHalf 0.0642 0.2009 0.3194 0.7494 
private_account:GameHalf2ndHalf 0.3827 0.1042 3.6719 0.0002 
     
Intercepts         
0|2 -10.1362 3.9585 -2.5606 0.0104 
2|4 -6.7677 3.9472 -1.7146 0.0864 
       
Residual Deviance:  1084.3870    
AIC:  1108.3870    
Table S2. Ordered logistic regression for the treatment without uncertainty. This table 
shows how much each feature influences the selection of an action for a player. The 
p-value threshold selected here is p<0.05. The results highlight that, among others,  
time (GameHalf) is a relevant feature, however, in the donation of the other members 
of the group (round_donations_others)  does not influence significantly the selection 
of an action. 
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Low uncertainty treatment (LU) 
Coefficients Value Std. Error t value p value 
public_account -0.0556 0.0090 -6.1725 < 0.0001 
private_account -0.4054 0.0199 -20.3623 < 0.0001 
round_donations_others 0.1178 0.0405 2.9103 0.0036 
actions_prev -0.1736 0.0955 -1.8177 0.0691 
GameHalf2ndHalf -11.4270 0.5859 -19.5022 < 0.0001 
rnd 0.0986 0.1436 0.6867 0.4923 
public_account:GameHalf2ndHalf 0.0130 0.0095 1.3606 0.1737 
round_donations_others:GameHalf2ndHal
f -0.0140 0.0471 -0.2961 0.7672 
actions_prev:GameHalf2ndHalf 0.3034 0.1132 2.6803 0.0074 
private_account:GameHalf2ndHalf 0.3342 0.0199 16.7546 < 0.0001 
     
Intercepts         
0|2 -16.4973 0.6035 -27.3366 < 0.0001 
2|4 -14.3607 0.5973 -24.0445 < 0.0001 
       
Residual Deviance:  
1419.840
0    
AIC:  
1443.840
0    
Table S3. Ordered logistic regression for the treatment with low uncertainty. The 
results for low uncertainty show that, like for no uncertainty, time is important. 
However, in this case, the donations of the other participants 
(round_donations_others) are also significantly affecting the action selection. 
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High uncertainty treatment (HU) 
Coefficients Value Std. Error t value p value 
public_account -0.0728 0.0189 -3.8568 < 0.0001 
private_account -0.3897 0.0218 -17.8795 < 0.0001 
round_donations_others 0.1503 0.0568 2.6442 0.0082 
actions_prev 0.0886 0.1039 0.8532 0.3936 
GameHalf2ndHalf -12.0490 0.5227 -23.0520 < 0.0001 
rnd -0.1145 0.1614 -0.7098 0.4779 
public_account:GameHalf2ndHalf 0.0347 0.0192 1.8070 0.0708 
round_donations_others:GameHalf2ndHalf 0.0121 0.0621 0.1956 0.8449 
actions_prev:GameHalf2ndHalf 0.2040 0.1210 1.6852 0.0920 
private_account:GameHalf2ndHalf 0.3167 0.0224 14.1248 < 0.0001 
     
Intercepts         
0|2 -15.4816 0.5294 -29.2444 < 0.0001 
2|4 -13.6380 0.5254 -25.9587 < 0.0001 
       
Residual Deviance:  1145.2530    
AIC:  1169.2530    
Table S4. Ordered linear regression for the treatment with high uncertainty. Similar to 
the low uncertainty case, for high uncertainty we can observe that both time and the 
donations of other in the group are relevant features. 
 
Polynomial fitting 
 
Our analysis until now was mostly focused on identifying linear correlations, and 
their sign, between participants’ contributions and the contributions of their group 
mates. This choice allows us to extract meaningful relationships while avoiding 
overfitting. However, in some of the studied cases, as we would expect, the data 
dependency might be represented better by a curvilinear/polynomial model. Below we 
show that the conclusions presented in the main manuscript remain valid if high order 
fitting is chosen. 
 
In Tables S5-S10, we display the results of an ANOVA test that compares polynomial 
regressions of different order (from 1 to 4) for all the 6 cases analyzed in Figure 3 of 
the main manuscript. This test indicates whether increasing the order of the 
polynomial regression issues a significant improvement. In only 3 cases, a polynomial 
fit is significantly better than the linear model: no uncertainty and players meeting the 
target; low uncertainty and not meeting the target; and high uncertainty and not 
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meeting the target. In Figure S6, we show results analogous to Figure 3 of the main 
manuscript, but using the model that fits the best each case. We show that our 
conclusions do not change, and perhaps, it is even clearer that, in the certainty case, 
when players meet the target, they adopt a slightly compensatory behavior, while 
considerably lowering their contributions when the rest of the group adopt extreme 
actions: they donate either too much or too little. 
 
 
Model Res.Df RSS Df Sum of Sq. F Pr(>F)  
1 6 3.6549      
2 5 2.3961 1 1.25873 3.1757 0.1728  
3 4 1.867 1 0.52912 1.3349 0.3316  
4 3 1.1891 1 0.67793 1.7104 0.2821  
Table S5. ANOVA test for the no uncertainty treatment, and players that did not meet 
the target. No higher order polynomial model performs significantly better than the 
linear fit. 
 
Model Res.Df RSS Df Sum of Sq. F Pr(>F)  
1 8 3.3276      
2 7 3.2601 1 0.06752 0.6832 0.44611  
3 6 3.2579 1 0.00219 0.0222 0.887473  
4 5 0.4941 1 2.76378 27.9654 0.003223 ** 
Table S6. ANOVA test for the no uncertainty treatment, and players that met the 
target. A fourth order polynomial generates a significantly better fit than the linear 
model. 
 
Model Res.Df RSS Df Sum of Sq. F Pr(>F)  
1 6 2.37502      
2 5 2.277 1 0.09802 0.377 0.58265  
3 4 0.78189 1 1.49511 5.75 0.09605 . 
4 3 0.78006 1 0.00183 0.007 0.9385  
Table S7. ANOVA test for the low uncertainty treatment, and players that did not 
meet the target.  A third order polynomial provides a better fit than the linear model. 
 
Model Res.Df RSS Df Sum of Sq. F Pr(>F) 
1 9 6.7944     
2 8 6.6108 1 0.18354 0.2259 0.6514 
3 7 5.6696 1 0.94127 1.1584 0.3232 
 
 
21 
 
4 6 4.8753 1 0.79422 0.9774 0.361 
Table S8. ANOVA test for the low uncertainty treatment, and players that met the 
target. No model provides a better fit than the lineal model. 
 
Model Res.Df RSS Df Sum of Sq. F Pr(>F)  
1 7 2.22619      
2 6 1.49467 1 0.73152 5.9811 0.07078 . 
3 5 0.93891 1 0.55576 4.5441 0.10002  
4 4 0.48922 1 0.44969 3.6768 0.12764  
Table S9. ANOVA test for the high uncertainty treatment, and players that did not 
meet the target. A second order polynomial provides a better fit than the linear model. 
 
Model Res.Df RSS Df Sum of Sq. F Pr(>F) 
1 7 3.6     
2 6 3.5877 1 0.01231 0.0191 0.8969 
3 5 3.2477 1 0.33999 0.5262 0.5084 
4 4 2.5846 1 0.66316 1.0263 0.3683 
Table S10. ANOVA test for the high uncertainty treatment, and players that met the 
target. No model provides a better fit than the linear model. 
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Figure S6. Analysis of conditional behavior using the best fitting model for each 
case. Applying the best fitting model identified through our tests to each treatment 
does not change our conclusions, but highlights that on the certainty treatment, when 
players meet the collective target, they display a slight compensatory behavior, while 
considerably lowering their contributions when the rest of the group adopt extreme 
actions: they donate either too much or too little. 
 
Supplementary model results 
Here we show additional results of our evolutionary game theoretical model2–4. As 
fully detailed in the Methods section, we consider five representative strategies 
encountered in our experiments: always-0 (AL0), always-2 (AL2), always-4 (AL4), 
compensator (COMP), and reciprocal (RECI). The first three strategies always invest 
the same: 0, 2, and 4, respectively, independently of the behavior of their opponents. 
Compensators only invest when the group members did not invest, and reciprocal 
players will invest as long as the group members are always investing (see Methods 
for details). All strategies stop investing once the threshold is reached. 
 
We analyze the behavioral dynamics in large (but finite) populations, when 
individuals revise their choice through imitation dynamics or social learning5–7. 
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Strategies that do well are imitated more often and spread in the population. 
Particularly, at each time step, the strategy of one randomly selected individual A is 
updated. With probability µ, A undergoes a mutation. With probability 1 − µ, another 
randomly selected individual B acts as a role model for A. The probability that A 
adopts the strategy of B equals p = *1 + 𝑒"($!%$")-%'; A sticks to his/her former 
strategy with probability 1 − p. This update rule is known as the pairwise comparison 
rule 7 where fA and fB denote the fitness of individual A and B, respectively, as defined 
in the Methods section. The parameter β ≥ 0, measures the strength of selection. In 
the limit of strong selection (β → ∞), the probability p is either zero or one. In the 
limit of weak selection (β → 0), p is always equal to 1/2, irrespective of the fitness of 
A and B. We have checked that our results are qualitatively invariant for a broad range 
of values of β. 
 
If the mutation probability µ is sufficiently small, the time between two mutation 
events is so large that, before the next mutation occurs, the population will evolve to a 
configuration in which all individuals adopt the same strategy. In this case, the 
dynamics can be approximated by means of a Markov chain whose states correspond 
to the five homogeneous states of the population (for each of the five strategies 
studied here).  
 
The transitions of this Markov chain are defined by the fixation probabilities 𝜌() of a 
single mutant with strategy j in a population of individuals adopting another strategy i. The transition matrix Λ = *Λ()- combines the different probabilities that a 
population in a homogeneous state Si will end up in state Sj after the occurrence of one 
single mutation. This matrix is given by Λ() = *#$+ (𝑗 ≠ 𝑖), whereas the diagonal of the 
transition matrix is defined by Λ(( = 1 − '+∑ 𝜌()),(  (note that 4 is the number of 
strategies minus one). The normalized left eigenvector associated with eigenvalue 1 
of matrix Λ determines the stationary distribution, i.e, the fraction of time the 
population spends in each of the homogeneous states. 
 
In the limit of neutral selection (β = 0), the fixation probabilities become independent 
of the fitness values and equal to 1/Z, offering a convenient reference scenario. 
 
 
24 
 
Transitions above this threshold are said to be favored by natural selection. In Figure 
S6 we show these transitions for two of the most paradigmatic scenarios: NU and HU. 
For instance, if an arrow goes from a state with strategy 𝑖 to state with strategy 𝑗, it 
indicates that a mutant of strategy 𝑗 will invade the population of strategy 𝑖 with a 
probability which is higher than the one we obtain from neutral drift. The absence of 
an arrow indicates that such transition will occur with a low probability, i.e., with a 
probability lower than 1/Z.  In this context, a strategy 𝑗 is said to be evolutionary 
robust (ERS)3,4 if no mutant, adopting any other strategy, has a selective advantage. In 
other words, we can identify strategies that are evolutionary robust (a measure of 
stability) by noticing that there is no arrow emerging from its respective node (see 
Figure S6).  
 
Figure S6 illustrates a reference scenario in what concerns the invasion dynamics of 
strategies. In the absence of uncertainty, always-0 and the always-2 strategy are the 
only two evolutionary robust strategies. Moreover, given the number and strength of 
the transitions, the fair strategy can easily become the most prevalent behavior. 
Differently, under high timing uncertainty, the always-2 strategy starts to be invaded 
by compensators and always-0 (Figure S7b), changing the ecology of behaviors 
observed in the absence of uncertainty. In fact, uncertainty can easily lead to complex 
behavioral dynamics, with cyclic dominances, and no evolutionary robust strategies, 
as illustrated in the right panel of Figure S6. Reciprocators can invade always-0, yet 
losing to compensators, which, in turn, are invaded by always-0. From this cyclic 
dynamic, even if not stable, both conditional strategies emerge as prevailing 
strategies, leading both to the emergence of reciprocity and polarization (see main 
text).  
 
The limit of rare mutations allows us to conveniently employ a small-scale Markov 
chain to analytically compute the prevalence of each strategy. This is achieved by 
restricting the number of strategies simultaneously co-existing in a population (and 
groups) to a maximum of two. However, for arbitrary mutation rates, we may have a 
complex co-existence of more than two strategies, calling for the adoption of large-
scale computer simulations to confirm the validity of our theoretical results in other 
mutation (or exploration) regimes. To perform these computer simulations, we mimic 
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the evolutionary process described above, with discrete steps involving imitation and 
mutation, yet without any constraint in the value of  (here a free variable). At the 
beginning of each simulation, each individual randomly adopts one of the five 
strategies. In each generation, Z individuals are chosen to revise their strategy (in an 
asynchronous manner). For each combination of parameters, we run 30 simulations, 
each lasting 10- generations. The fitness of each individual A is calculated as the 
average return earned from 10. games played against N-1 individuals randomly 
selected from the population. The group achievement is computed from the average 
fraction of groups that surpassed the threshold after a transient period of 10/ 
generations. The same criterion is used to compute the overall level of polarization 
emerging from each simulation.  
 
In Figure S8, we confirm that the stationary distribution obtained under the small 
mutation limit assumption is valid for a wide range of mutation values. Additionally, 
we also include the polarization results, considering only group combinations that 
achieve the target, with and without mutation (see Figure S9), showing that results 
discussed in the main text remain valid for a broad interval of exploration rates. 
 
Figure S7. Markov chain depicting the transition probabilities between states. In panel 
a) we show the Markov chain when there is no timing uncertainty. An arrow that goes 
from state 𝒊 to 𝒋 indicates that a population in state 𝒊 (where all members of the 
population are of strategy 𝒊) will transition to strategy 𝒋 with a probability higher than 
random drift. The number on top of each state indicates the stationary distribution, 
µ
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i.e., the time the population spends in that state. When there is no timing uncertainty, 
always-2 is an evolutionary stable strategy (all arrows point to it, and none goes out). 
However, in the high timing uncertainty case (Panel b), it becomes dominated by 
always-0. Also, reciprocal strategy weakly dominates always-0, resulting in a cyclic 
dynamic (no strategy dominates). This explain the reduction in always-2 players and 
the increase of reciprocals.  
 
 
Figure S8. Influence of noise (mutation) in the stationary distribution. This figure 
shows how the stationary distribution of the monomorphic states (only one strategy in 
the population) is affected by the mutation probability (the probability that a random 
mutant appears in the population). The results show that the small mutation 
assumption in the theoretical model is valid for a large value of mutation probabilities 
both in the case of no uncertainty (Panel a) and high uncertainty (Panel b). Only for 
mutation values higher than 𝟏𝟎%𝟐 does the distribution get significantly affected. In 
this case, mixed states (more than one strategy survives in the population) become 
more common (𝛃 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟑, 𝒁 = 𝟓𝟎). 
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Figure S9. Distribution of donations when only considering successful groups. In 
panel (a) we show the fraction of the population that invests more, less or equal to the 
fair donation (F), considering only groups that achieve the target. We can observe 
that, while in the no uncertainty (NU) case, successful groups either invest equal or 
above F, an important fraction of the population invests below F in the timing 
uncertainty cases. This indicates the emergence of polarization with timing 
uncertainty, as we observed in the experiments. In panel (b), we show the same 
results, but considering a mutation rate 𝛍 = 𝟏𝟎%𝟐. Here, our model’ results matches 
closely the experimental results for NU, while it predicts an even more extreme case 
of polarization for LU and HU. 
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